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PROBABILITY theory and Bayesian reasoning have been used widely and successfully for modelling
perception and cognition in recent times (e.g. Chater et al., 2006, and Chater and Manning, 2006) but, for
some reason, application of these approaches in musical research has been rather sporadic, even though
many scholars since Leonard Meyer (1957) have noted that many concepts in music might lend themselves
naturally to a formulation in probability theory. So, David Temperley is right to say, in the introduction to
his new book, that “the time is ripe, then, for a reconsideration of music and probability” (p. 1).
With Music and Probability, Temperley sets out to fulfill two main tasks: to give an introduction
to Bayesian reasoning and probabilistic models; and to present actual research that demonstrates the
strengths of this approach when employed for modelling musical phenomena. For the latter, the book not
only covers his own probabilistic models but also summarises very concisely and thoroughly related work
by other researchers (this is one of his strengths as a writer). At the very beginning, three basic principles
are proposed: that “perception is an inferential, multileveled, uncertain process”; that “our knowledge of
probabilities comes, in large part, from regularities in the environment”; and that “producers of
communication are sensitive to, and affected by, its probabilistic nature” (p. 3).
These axiomatic statements provide the motivation for Temperley’s engagement with probabilistic
models, and lead into an introduction to probability theory sufficient to provide an intuitive understanding
of the concepts required to understand later material.  Conditional probability is introduced and followed
through to Bayes’ rule, used throughout in the book, most often in the form:
P (structure|surface) ?  P (surface|structure) P (structure)  (p. 11),
where P (structure|surface) denotes the probability that a given musical surface has a certain
structure, and where ‘surface’ and ‘structure’ refer respectively to some directly observable factor in
musical data (e.g. notes in a bar) and some underlying structure to be inferred (e.g. the tonality of that bar).
With an example borrowed from speech recognition, Temperley demonstrates that one of the
advantages of Bayesian reasoning is that inference from probabilistic models can be informed by prior
domain knowledge. It is unfortunate that this example is somewhat atypical of the remainder of the book,
being a rare case where a non-uniform prior distribution is used and the full posterior distribution is
calculated.
Other probabilistic concepts are discussed in the introductory chapters, most importantly entropy
and cross-entropy in the context of model-fitting. The discussion of the need to be careful about
assumptions made, is well put, and leads into a brief introduction to finite-state and hidden Markov models.
The introductory section concludes with a survey of early work on probability and music, with
particular reference to the observations from Cohen (1962) about the need to model listeners’ background
appropriately. Temperley’s own criticism of previous work employing probabilistic models is that it
modelled the stream of surface events in music directly, rather than building models of underlying
structure, which he argues is closer to the listening process.
Temperley’s Models
In chapters 3, 4, and 6, Temperley presents his three main probabilistic models. The application
and discussion of these models covers the major part of remainder of the book. Chapter 3 introduces the
rhythm model whose purpose is to infer a metrical grid (the structure) from a monodic sequence of note
onsets (the surface). In comparison to other Bayesian approaches to this problem (e.g., Raphael, 2002;
Cemgil et al., 2000), Temperley is concerned with inferring a complete metrical grid (rather than a score
position relative to the bar) using a simple model with as few parameters as possible. Following the
Bayesian approach, he selects the most probable grid given the onset pattern of a concrete rhythm
sequence. This, in turn, requires a model that estimates the likelihood of an onset pattern given a metrical
grid and the prior probability of a metrical grid; the most probable grid is then the one that maximises the
product of the likelihood and the prior over all possible grids. The grids considered consist of three
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hierarchical levels: the tactus, a higher level and a lower level. In order to infer the prior probabilities of
metrical grids, Temperley introduces a number of parameters that control factors such as the relative
probability of a duple or triple upper level, the initial tactus interval and so on. He estimates these
parameters either empirically from the Essen Folk Song Collection (EFSC) or he assigns reasonable values
himself. A dynamic programming solution is presented to reduce the computational complexity of
maximising the product of the likelihood and the prior over all possible grids. In contrast to the overall tone
of this book and to the extremely clear description of dynamic programming in his previous book
(Temperley, 2001), the description provided here is rather dense and technical.
The rhythm model is tested on Temperley’s own performances of 65 melodies from the EFSC in a
quantisation and note alignment task, using the proportion of note onsets correctly aligned with beats at the
correct level as an evaluation metric. In comparison to his Melisma model (Temperley, 2001), the Bayesian
model performs well on level 1 beats (supra-tactus) but somewhat less well on levels 2 (tactus) and 3 (sub-
tactus). Further applications of the rhythm model are described in chapter 5. In an error detection task using
10 randomly distorted versions for each of the same 65 melodies from the EFSC, the model assigns the
undistorted folk melody a higher probability than the distorted version in 82% of cases. The modelling of
rhythmic expectations is also discussed, briefly and in qualitative terms, as a potential additional
application of the rhythm model.
In chapter 4, Temperley presents his pitch model whose purpose is to infer a musical key (the
structure) from a monodic sequence of pitches (the surface). The chapter begins with a clear review of
related research but fails to specifically motivate the need for a new model, probabilistic or otherwise. As
with the rhythm model, the pitch model is based on a set of assumptions about how surfaces are generated
from structures. These assumptions are embodied in distributions (whose parameters are estimated from the
EFSC) governing the range of a melody (range profile), the pitch proximity of successive notes (proximity
profile) and the conditional probability of chromatic scale degrees given a major or minor key (the key
profile). The generative process involves selecting a key and central pitch (from distributions estimated
from the EFSC) and then sampling successive pitches from an RPK profile (obtained by taking the product
of the Range, Proximity and Key profiles). Therefore, the probability of a given pitch in a melody is the
normalised product of its probability in the range profile (given the central pitch), its probability in the
proximity profile (given the previous pitch) and its probability in the key profile (given the selected key).
This model can be used to estimate the probability of a pitch sequence given a key; the key that maximises
the likelihood of a given pitch sequence is selected. The pitch model is tested in several ways. First, its
performance as a model of key finding is examined on the same 65 melodies from the EFSC used in
chapter 3 and the 48 fugue subjects of Bach’s Well Tempered Clavier. The predicted key was the same as
the annotated key in 87.7% and 83.3% of cases respectively. This performance appears to be comparable to
other existing key-finding algorithms.
Temperley goes on to use the pitch model to predict expectations in terms of the conditional
probability of a pitch given a preceding sequence of pitches. Using parameters estimated from the EFSC,
this model achieves a reasonable fit to a set of data reflecting human pitch expectations in single interval
contexts (Cuddy & Lunny, 1995). By hand-optimising the parameters to the data, however,  Temperley was
able to achieve a better fit than existing rule-based models (Cuddy & Lunny, 1995; Schellenberg, 1997),
arguing that this optimisation is analogous to the least squares fitting used in multiple regression analysis of
these models. Finally, on an error detection test (comparable to that used for the rhythm model), the pitch
model achieved a level of 88.2% accuracy in spotting randomly distorted folk melodies.
To find the key and possible key modulations in polyphonic pieces Temperley proposes a
procedure that differs slightly from these pitch and rhythm models. In contrast to the pitch and rhythm
models, the polyphonic key-finding model discards sequential information, dealing only with unordered
collections of note occurrences (represented as scale degrees) relative to the key of a passage of music. He
derives estimates of the scale degree frequencies from a corpus of common-practice pieces (Kostka &
Payne, 1995) reflecting early 19th century music which come with detailed annotations of key and
modulations. He then uses a generative model that calculates the product of the probabilities of scale degree
sets given a key and modulation within a sequence of keys. Again, dynamic programming is used to find
the sequence of keys that maximises this probability for a given sequence of scale degree sets. When
evaluating the accuracy of the model, it appears to be comparable to the Krumhansl-Schmuckler model
(Krumhansl, 1990) using the right scale degree profile and it is very similar to his own non-probabilistic
model from 2001. In fact, as he mentioned in the original publication of the polyphonic key finding model
(Temperley, 2004), the new probabilistic model is structurally very similar to the earlier rule-based model.
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And given the slightly better performance of the rule-based model, one is again left wondering about the
benefits of the Bayesian approach.
Other than the task of finding the key for a passage of polyphonic music, Temperley explores using
the model to address questions that are somewhat more interesting from a musicological or music-theoretic
perspective. With references to the literature, he discusses the relations between keys, the measurement of
tonalness and tonal ambiguity, differences between major and minor, and harmonic ambiguities in common
practice music and music from the classical period.
The Larger Picture
In the last two chapters, Temperley takes a step away from the applications of the individual
models and discusses various topics in music theory and music perception. It is one of the virtues of this
book that it tries to pull several strands of thinking together, which come from areas such as empirical
musicology, music theory, perception and cognition, as well as music information retrieval. But once again
the reader might struggle to find a convincing connection between the problems addressed and the
necessity of the probabilistic approach in doing so.
In Chapter 9, Temperley considers broader issues, making the important point that Bayesian model
comparison allows the comparative evaluation of different models of the same musical surface, giving
examples using tempo and Schenkerian analysis. In the latter case, he explores how ‘Schenkerian theory’
might be evaluated as a theory, starting from a hypothetical probabilistic, generative model of the theory
and then using cross entropy to assess the probability of the theory given musical examples. Implicit in this
is a comparison with other generative theories, such as his own discussed earlier in the book. A caution
here seems necessary – this comparison is only valid where the models aim to explain the same musical
surface and nothing else. Whatever Schenkerian analysis claims for itself (and an exploration of its diverse
churches and their philosophies is well beyond the scope of both the book and this review; see Cook, 1987,
chapters 2 and 6), it never claims to account fully for all the surface pitches or rhythms on the page: since
the elaborative processes considered are simply a restatement of musical theories of counterpoint, and since
the background structures permit significant insertion of ‘implied’ pitches, a generative Schenkerian model
is unlikely to perform better than other music-theoretic models and could easily perform worse. Moreover,
since Temperley quite rightly suggests an important supplementary evaluation of models based on a
quantitative version of Occam’s razor, the theory is almost certain to fail. Should one throw Schenkerian
theory away if this happens? Schenkerians who agree with the foregoing reasoning might feel justified in
arguing that the method “aims to omit inessentials and to highlight important relationships” (Cook, 1987, p.
28). Thus, whilst Temperley’s explanation of how an automated analysis system might operate is a useful
one as illustration of another application of Bayesian reasoning, it is unclear how Schenkerian theory could
be evaluated purely in terms of notated surface pitches and rhythms.
In the final chapter, Temperley steps from a purely probabilistic world to a more directly cognitive
one, introducing communicative pressure, which relates to the third of the basic principles stated in the
introduction and is probably the most important cognitive concept of the entire book. It is defined as a
general principle for enabling successful communication through agreement between sender and receiver
about the constraints for retrieving a message (structure) from a communicative signal (surface). Adopting
the old sender-channel-receiver model from communication theory for the musical context, he exemplifies
this principle by discussing several phenomena from different musical styles, among them voice-leading
rules in polyphonic art music, the trade-off between expressive tempo [1] and syncopation in common-
practice art music vs. popular music, and the trade-off between chord inversions and extensions in
common-practice music and jazz. The essence of communicative pressure is that a composer has to put
strong constraints on one musical dimension if he wants to make expressive use of another related
dimension (e.g. you can’t have a high level of syncopation and tempo variation at the same time without
blurring the rhythmic structure).
There are at least two points of concern regarding the empirical support for this concept and
regarding the concept itself.  Addressing the former, Temperley continues to argue empirically as he did in
previous chapters, but the empirical evidence he uses becomes quite sparse and misleading at times. So his
style of argument approximates the convince-by-example approach widely used in music theory, but
disguised with empirical terminology. It is generally accepted, for example, that the use of expressive
tempo in Western Classical music increased throughout the 19th century, but not only is this very hard, if
Empirical Musicology Review Vol. 2, No. 4 (2007)
158
not impossible, to evaluate, but it also makes it difficult to take seriously the implication that
communicative pressure requires maximal communication between sender and receiver. Temperley’s
observation of an increase in regularity in the right-hand patterns of piano music is intended to explain the
increase of expressive timing between the 18th and 19th century, but is fallacious and based on a
comparison between different genres of music (something that he partly addresses in a footnote).
The discussion of voice-leading is similarly awkward, failing to discuss or acknowledge the points
at which the ‘rules’ are not applied with the same rigour, even though the effects are audible (for example,
and considering only Western music: very early polyphonic choral music, e.g. Perotin’s famous Sederunt
Principes; much instrumental music, especially for chord-playing instruments; and popular musics) or the
points at which they are applied where they would not be perceptible (such as Tallis’s Spem in Alium which
contains no parallel fifths even though, with up to 40 independent voices at a time, it is unlikely that they
would be noticed)
For the assessment of the occurrences of chord inversion and extensions the common practice
repertoire is compared to 50 jazz pieces as laid down in the lead-sheet format of the New Real Book.  More
inversions are observed in the common practice pieces but more chord extensions in the jazz pieces. It
seems surprisingly naive to assume that Real Book lead-sheets reflect actual compositions or performances.
They are clearly meant as indications of the significant melodic and harmonic constituents of a piece of
popular music, but for most standard jazz pieces (see Tagg, 2003) there is no indication whatsoever of
which note a bass player is supposed to play for a certain chord or what the spacing of a piano chord should
be. [2] This would in fact be contrary to the very core principles of jazz. In the particular book that he uses,
the arrangements are generally slightly simplified for reading ease and only show bass progressions in a
small number of cases. If taken at all as an example repertoire, one would have to transcribe jazz
performances to observe the interplay between actual bass notes and chord extensions. Even so,
Temperley’s core observation, that there is ambiguity between chords in jazz is significant here. Often, the
only difference between two chord labels is the choice of bass note; in such a situation, the identity of the
chord is defined by the bass and, as such, inversion is impossible, since it would change the chord label.
The second point of concern relates to the simplistic communication model which forms the basis
of the communicative pressure principle. Firstly, there is a long history of fierce debate about whether
music can be considered a language with the aim of communicating messages; the strong opposition to this
claim in the literature isn’t even mentioned (see e.g., Agawu, 1999; Samson, 1999; Storr, 1992). Secondly,
even if music can be considered a language, would the musical structure be the message? This again is a
venerable and controversial topic in music theory dating back to Hanslick (1854). Given the debate about
communication and meaning in music, it is highly controversial whether these concepts can be tied to notes
on a score. Even if they can, is it really the key and the metre that a composer wants to convey to a listener?
In short, the theoretical foundations of the concept of communicative pressure in music have yet to be laid.
Another point that seems problematic about the concept of communicative pressure is that, unlike
David Huron in his recent book (Huron, 2006), Temperley makes no clear distinction between musical
models of perception and production (or even between perception and transcription). In chapter 9, for
example, he considers differences between compositional styles in terms of different parameterisations of
the pitch and rhythm models. This assumption that producers and perceivers share essentially the same
cognitive representations and machinery for processing music is expanded in chapter 10 as the basis for the
concept of communicative pressure. Here, the same generative systems are clearly being used as models of
both perception and composition, in spite of the fact that Temperley states (of the rhythm model) that (p.
31): “This generative model – like those presented in later chapters – is not intended as a model of the
creative process, only as a model of how listeners might model that process for the purposes of meter
perception.” However, it seems likely that the cognitive mechanisms underlying the perception and
production of music do differ (Huron, 2006; Sadakata et al., 2006) and that their comparison in a specific
domain could reveal interesting insights.
Discussion
It is not only the last two chapters that exhibit a weak approach towards model evaluation and
hypothesis testing. In chapter 3, for example, the fact that Temperley performs the melodies used to test the
rhythm model is a potential source of bias. One also wonders why the same 65 folk melodies are used in all
tests of the pitch and the rhythm models: more reliable estimates of generalisation performance could be
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obtained by examining other training and test sets. Furthermore, when comparing the performance of other
models, significance values for differences are not given. [3] We learn, for example, that three polyphonic
key finding models achieve accuracies of 84.9%, 86.3% and 80.4% respectively but have no idea of
whether these performance differences are really significant. Finally, the comparison of the proposed
models to existing models is often incomplete (e.g., chapters 3 and 4) or absent, as in chapter 8 which fails
to acknowledge a venerable tradition of research that has explored in detail the use of information-theoretic
measures (including cross-entropy) for evaluating, comparing and selecting predictive models of musical
structure (see e.g., Cohen, 1962; Conklin & Witten, 1995; Pearce & Wiggins, 2004).
As just one example of the problems arising from evaluation methodology, it is worth looking at
chapter 7, where Temperley tests a hypothesis supporting his concept of communicative pressure discussed
in chapter 10. The hypothesis states that the pitch-class content of a V-I cadence in the major is
substantially more ‘tonally ambiguous’ than either a V7-I cadence or a V-I cadence in the minor. At points
where the composer is attempting to unambiguously communicate tonality (such as, by Temperley’s
argument, the final point of a movement), V-I transitions in the major should be disfavoured. Table 7.6
illustrates the results from his empirical evaluation of final cadences of piano sonatas from Haydn, Mozart,
and Beethoven, and he makes the claim (p.134) that for all three composers, it can be seen that the
proportion of V-I cadences in minor-key movements is much higher than in major-key movements; in all
three corpora, this difference is reported as being statistically significant according to a x
2
 test and this is
taken to be a successful prediction of his model of tonal ambiguity in compositional practice. Temperley
presents the data from his empirical evaluation in sufficient detail that readers can perform their own
analyses from their own perspectives (effectively, with different prior probabilities), such that any Bayesian
analyst can model this experiment and generate likelihoods and posterior distributions himself. Noting first
that the x
2
 statistic and p-value for the Mozart corpus are incorrect in table 7.6 [4], we agree that the raw
data tabulated are certainly suggestive [5] and merit further examination. Looking into the empirical
procedures in greater detail, then, we consider the method by which Temperley classifies the final cadence
into these categories. [6] The method includes a strict set of criteria for accepting the final cadence of a
movement into the test set, and indeed many sonata movements have been eliminated from consideration.
[7] This is problematic, as it is likely that the effect is to remove a disproportionate number of tonally-
ambiguous (in Temperley’s pitch-class sense) final sections, which evidently has an impact on what the
analysis is purporting to demonstrate. Another danger of the overly simple procedure for identifying final
cadences and their classification into V7-I or V-I is that it ignores (possibly varied) repetitions and simply
identifies the final cadence wrongly. [8]
In conclusion with respect to this single example, we take the view that (aside from the error in the
table of results) there are several major methodological problems in acquiring the data analysed, which are
in some respects representative of the evaluation methodology that Temperley applies at several points in
his book.
Leaving aside the evaluation methodology, another aspect of the book that is worth discussing is
Temperley’s treatment of cognitive and perceptual processes. Although one of his aims is to “to uncover
the mental processes and representations involved in musical behaviour” (p. 5), he makes little attempt to
compare the behaviour of the various models proposed to human behaviour. Instead, music analysis is
generally used as a proxy for music perception. This approach avoids the need to run time-consuming
experiments on listeners and is relatively common in research on music cognition. However, while
musicological analyses will often accord with perceived musical structures, the correspondence cannot
always be assumed. For example, good performance of the pitch model in predicting the keys annotated by
musicologists does not necessarily indicate a good model of human key perception. Listeners might
perform much worse than the model with respect to the annotated keys; reproducing the failures would be
just as important in evaluating a cognitive model as reproducing the successes. One of the few places that
Temperley does use behavioural data from human listeners is in evaluating the pitch model against the
experimental data reported by Cuddy and Lunny (1995). However, this is not a very demanding test of a
model of melodic expectations since the judgements were elicited in the context of a single isolated
interval. It is more interesting to ask whether such a model, without substantial reconfiguration, continues
to predict the expectations of listeners elicited in a range of melodic contexts differing in length, style and
structural setting (Pearce & Wiggins, 2006).
In summary, Temperley is right to assert that there is a pressing need for a textbook on Bayesian
reasoning and probabilistic modelling in music. However, it is not clear that this book completely satisfies
this need. The introduction to probabilistic modelling from a Bayesian perspective seems all too brief at
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times and the interested reader will have to resort to a technical textbook for more thorough explanations.
Furthermore, this book is unlikely to convince a non-Bayesian audience of the specific advantages of this
approach to music cognition. The performance of his Bayesian models on specific tasks is not clearly
superior to existing models, and the claims of improved rigour and objectivity, frequently made throughout
the book, are at odds with the methodological shortcomings in empirical evaluation and theoretical
reasoning.
Marcus Pearce, Daniel Müllensiefen, David Lewis, Christophe Rhodes
Goldsmiths College, University of London
NOTES
[1] Temperley here uses the unfortunate term rubato, clearly meaning the later usage of this word, as
unstructured, expressive rhythmic variation. The earlier usage, which co-existed with this throughout the
nineteenth century, would suggest a strict tempo with timing variations only below the bar level. Since
these two meanings would have different implications for this discussion, we choose to avoid the term
altogether.
[2] Notable exceptions include, for example, pieces using slash chords where the (often non-triadic) bass
note is part of the harmonic sonority and has to be specified separately, as in many funk- and rock-jazz
pieces. Slash chords are in any case a harmonic phenomenon that clearly differs from inversions in classical
harmony theory.
[3] While a Bayesian statistician might not wish to perform a significance test in the usual frequentist style,
there are nevertheless ways of summarising the belief that the performance of two experiments has yielded
a different result, for instance by examining the variability of the results of the experiments or the posterior
distributions of any inferred parameters.
[4] Consider the Mozart corpus and estimating from the tabulated results, the null hypothesis is p(V-I) =















, of 2.33, corresponding to p > .05 from a x
2
 distribution with
d.f.=1 – or a less significant statistic if Yates’ continuity correction is applied.  The other values given in
table 7.6 are reproducible following the above method (without Yates’ correction).
[5] In the Mozart case, they can be no more than suggestive – with only three pieces of data in the Minor
category, only very extreme values for the proportion are excluded; the evidence for the Haydn and
Beethoven cases is stronger, as there are more data included.
[6] Working on a ‘tactus’ (defined by the time-signature) granularity, Temperley identifies the ‘final tonic
span’ as the longest continuous region from the end containing scale degrees ˆ1, ˆ3 and ˆ5 only; then the
‘final dominant span’ as the longest continuous region abutting the final tonic span containing no scale
degrees but ˆ5, ˆ7, ˆ2 and ˆ4, containing at least one ˆ5 and ˆ7, and with ˆ5 as the lowest pitch. If either of
these final spans cannot be found, then the movement is discarded from consideration; otherwise, the final
cadence is classified as V7 - I if the final dominant span contains a ˆ4 and V- I otherwise.
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[7] While Temperley counts 24 final cadences from Mozart sonata movements, he disregards another 30 –
and the proportion eliminated is even greater for both Haydn and Beethoven, where 50 and 60 movements
respectively have been excluded. In addition to these exclusions, early Haydn sonatas are removed from
consideration, on the basis that they have thin two-part textures and often do not use ‘complete’ harmonies
at cadences.
[8] Consider the end of Mozart’s Sonata in C minor, K457, first movement as displayed in the Figure 1
below. Temperley’s prescription for finding the final cadence will identify regions labelled VT and IT, and
will count this movement as having a V-I final cadence. Note that the bar in which VT is located is an
analogue of the bar before, where the pitch set for the analogous part of the bar is the V7 pitch class set,
which suggests that the underlying harmony (considering the last crotchet of the two bars in aggregate) is
suggestive of V7. Two other things to note are that although the time signature of this sonata movement is
4/4, the pulse is minim-based rather than crotchet – and using a minim-based segmentation rather than a
crotchet-based one would have led to this movement being excluded. More fundamentally still, though, it
might validly be argued that the moment of tonal closure is not the final cadence but eight bars before it
(marked VX , with the last ten bars of the movement being an elaboration on the tonic). Taking that view,
the cadence is clearly V7-I. Indeed, as Schoenberg (1967, p. 185) observes “Since many movements have
no codas, it is evident that the coda must be considered as an extrinsic addition. The assumption that it
serves to establish the tonality is hardly justified; it could scarcely compensate for failure to establish the
tonality in the previous sections.”
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Fig. 1: Final bars of W.A. Mozart’s Sonata in C minor, K457, first movement. The final cadence as
identified by Temperley’s procedure is labeled VT and IT. An alternative candidate for the final cadence is
marked by VX and IX in the score.
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